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As the winter weather caught shoppers by surprise before 
Christmas, it also appeared to have an impact on the UK 
growth figures. While the Scottish economy had seen 
growth through Q1, Q2 and Q3 2010, preliminary UK GDP 
figures for Q4 showed a -0.5% contraction, and that the 
“thaw” in the UK growth position remains weak. While much 
of the Q4 figures were linked to the bad weather conditions 
through December, we had anticipated that, among other 
things, the run up to Christmas and the announced VAT 
increase starting in January 2011 would have brought some 
consumer expenditure forward into Q4 2010. Commentators 
were typically expecting this single quarters figure to be 
revised upwards but it would be a significant revision for this 
preliminary estimate to become a positive growth figure.   In 
fact, the most recent Q4 estimate is a contraction of 0.6%. 
This serves to indicate that – as anticipated – the return to 
growth after the recession of 2008-9 will continue to be 
choppy and weak. The National Institute’s latest Economic 
Review (from January 2011) predicts that “the majority of 
the temporary loss” due to the weather from Q4 2010 will be 
regained in Q1 2011. In line with convention, we will have 
Scotland’s Q4 2010 GDP estimate in April 2011, which will 
give us our first indication for the rate of growth in the 
Scottish economy in 2010. We continue to forecast growth 
in Scotland for 2010 of 1.0% in our central scenario, 
unchanged from November’s publication. We do however 
“narrow” the range in our alternative scenarios around the 
central scenario, with between the high and low growth 
cases, as would be anticipated with the release of more 
data covering to the end of 2010.  Since our last forecast the 
recent slight improvement in labour market figures means 
that we have revised down (up) our estimates of 
unemployment (and employment) at the end of 2010. 
Growth in 2011, 2012 and 2013 continues to be uncertain 
as the global economic situation remains weak, with 
Scottish exports, for example, typically disconnected from 
the major growth economies, public sector fiscal 
consolidation most significant in 2011, and welfare spending 
reductions directly hitting household finances towards the 
end of our forecast period. 
 
Monetary and fiscal policy climate 
The UK monetary policy environment continues to be 
supportive, despite high profile debates in the media and 
within the MPC itself, about the appropriateness of its 
monetary policy stance.  CPI inflation stood at 4% in 
January 2011, well above its 2% inflation target, in part due 
to increases in energy and food prices, rising import prices, 
and the VAT increase starting in January 2011, however, 
core inflation remaining sluggishly around 1%, and there is 
unprecedented policy tension within the MPC. The Bank’s 
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Governor, Mervyn King, noted in February’s Inflation report 
that there is a downside risk to impacting on growth 
prospects from increasing interest rates, but that market 
expectations were for increases of one quarter percent from 
early summer 2011, and perhaps a further rise before the 
end of the year. The Governor has noted that a period of 
above-target inflation will continue over much of the first half 
of 2011. In the opinion of the MPC, the “Committee judges 
that a reasonable central view is that measured inflation will 
begin to fall back next year”. The Bank’s (nine-member) 
MPC appears to be more split than ever, with growing fears 
of losing credibility over inflation, but concerns of interest 
rate increases – the major instrument in the Bank’s control – 
at a time when the growth of the UK economy is not 
assured. It appears that the Q4 2010 GDP figures for the 
UK, combined with relatively weak survey data – although 
typically, the evidence is mixed – on industrial production in 
the start of 2011 could delay until later in the year any 
increases in interest rates. Interest rates remain at 0.5%, 
where they have been kept since March 2009. Concern 
about the true size of excess capacity in the economy will 
continue to be seen as a technical exercise, but is crucial for 
the MPC’s decisions about the timing of anticipated future 
interest rate rises. 
 
On the fiscal side in Scotland, on the 9th of February 2011 
the Scottish Parliament approved its one year Budget for 
2011-12. The total size of the budget for the year is £33,620 
million (Total Managed Expenditure), split between 
Resource Departmental Expenditure Limits (DEL) of 
£25,400 million, Capital DEL of £2,607 million and Annually 
Managed Expenditure of £5,612 million. Capital spending 
has borne the brunt of planned expenditure reductions. A 
real terms decline of the order of 22% in this year from 
2010-11 levels will see project spending being reduced 
across a number of high-profile areas. Most of the reduction 
in Capital DEL spending projected over the UK 
Government’s spending review period (i.e. to 2014-15) 
takes place in this first year.  
 
As we discussed in November’s Commentary, the corollary 
of slightly smaller than expected reductions in the public 
sector budget available following the CSR was for a greater 
share of the UK’s fiscal consolidation to come from 
reductions in the welfare spend, which will directly impact on 
household incomes and expenditures. These are forecast to 
fall more heavily on the later years of the UK parliamentary 
cycle, up to 2014/15. The continued forecasted decline in 
government budgets over the next three years however, will 
continue to impact on the levels of activity in the Scottish 
economy, not only in the public service sectors, but in all 
sectors which rely on the public sector as the destination of 
goods and services. Further, it is anticipated that the public 
sector will continue to seek to reduce headline employment 
numbers as budgets are reduced. The extent to which these 
workers feed into unemployment will have an important 
consequence for our short- and medium-term forecasts of 
the labour market in Scotland, and we continue to monitor 
this situation closely (as is documented in the Overview of 
the Labour Market section of this Commentary. 
 
The Scottish economy 
The last quarter for which data are available is Q3 2010, 
released on 19th January 2011. Gross Value Added (GVA) 
in Scotland rose by 0.5% during Q3, following Q2’s 
significant increase of 1.3%. The revising down of Q3 2009 
to -0.1% from zero growth increases the length of the 
recession in Scotland from four to five quarters. 
The broad sectoral composition of the recent quarter’s 
growth, however, remains unbalanced. The production 
sector, covering 17.1% of the Scottish economy, registered 
a contraction of 0.3%, while the Services sector (producing 
73.7%) increased by 0.1%. The standout sector – for the 
second quarter in succession – was the Construction sector. 
This sector is only responsible for just under 8% of the 
economy, but its rise of 6.2% in Q3 was enough to 
contribute 0.5% to Q3 GVA. Growth in the public sectors of 
0.4% on the quarter made a contribution to growth; however 
a contraction in “Business services and finance” more than 
offset this. What was particularly striking from the 
preliminary UK GDP figures for Q4 2010 was the return of 
small decline in the UK construction sector, with little activity 
elsewhere to stimulate growth.  
 
Across the production sectors – which in aggregate 
contracted by 0.3% - most of the economic good news 
came from the manufacturing sector growing by 0.7%. This 
was led by strong performance in the “Chemicals and man-
made fibres” (+3.7%) and “Food and tobacco” (+2.6%) 
sectors. Weak performances in “Electricity gas and water 
supply” (-4.1%), “Metals and non-metal products” (-2.8%) 
and “Mining and quarrying” (-2.3%) were largely responsible 
for the decline in the GVA contribution of production in the 
Scottish economy. Labour market developments in Scotland 
to the end of December 2010, published in February are 
reviewed in the Labour Market section of this Commentary. 
 
Growth in the UK regions in 2009 
With the publication of UK Regional Accounts in December 
2010, relating to the calendar year 2009, we have been able 
to examine the performance of the Scottish economy in this 
year compared to other UK regions. Often this is more 
illuminating than comparing Scotland to the UK as a whole, 
since industrial structures across the regions will vary in 
interesting ways, which might be masked at the national 
level. Here we examine some of the recent evidence for 
questions linking regional growth performance to industrial 
structure. Much of the public discourse has argued that the 
industrial structure of the UK economy, and its regions, had 
become too “unbalanced”, relying heavily, the argument 
goes, on the financial services sector as the driver of 
growth.  
 
We therefore have undertaken a modest initial attempt to 
consider three points, which we list below: 
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 How has the industrial structure of the Scottish 
economy (and its diversity) varied over the last 
decade? 
 
 Was there any relationship between the level of 
diversity of a regions industrial structure and that 
regions growth performance during 2009, or over 
the last decade? 
 Was there any relationship between the size of the 
financial services sector in a region and that 
regions growth performance during 2009, or over 
the last decade? 
 
Firstly, we note that economic diversity is difficult to 
measure in practice. Most would agree that the concept of 
diversity can be nebulous. Stirling (1994) raises three
 
Figure 1:  Industrial structure of GVA in Scotland, 1989-2008 
 
 
 
Note:   for this the data used are the UK Regional Accounts, rather than the accounts for Scotland published by the Scottish Government.  
aspects of diversity which, taken together, serve to illustrate 
the most pertinent issues around this term (although in his 
example, he is interested in the diversity of the electricity 
generation mix). Stirling’s work illustrates neatly how 
diversity is a property of the whole system, rather than 
anything which an individual element can confer. This is a 
simple point, but crucial for the discussion which follows. We 
shall use the example of industrial structure to illustrate the 
three dimensions of diversity raised by Stirling (1994). The 
first point simply refers to the number of alternative items – 
in this case, economic sectors – which exist in the region. 
Other things being equal a higher number of sectors would 
be expected to indicate greater regional industrial diversity. 
Secondly, the similarity of the sectors is crucial. If, for 
example, there are a multitude of sectors in the region 
selling goods to household consumption (for example) then 
regional activity is more heavily exposed to variations in 
household income/expenditures. Finally, the notion of 
“balance” indicates whether each of the different sectors 
enjoy equal weights in activity. With exactly equal weights 
for sectors which were sufficiently different, in an extreme 
case, regional economic activity could be considered 
diverse.  A dominant sector in a region, however, would not 
typically indicate a diverse mix of industries.  
 
There exists an array of measures which we could use for 
diversity. For the purposes of this note, we use one of the 
simplest measures,   
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Figure 2:  Diversity of the Scottish industrial structure, 1989-2008 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  2008 regional industrial diversity and real 2009 GVA growth, UK regions 
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where N is the number of different categories (i.e. sectors) 
and it
p
is the share of total GVA in sector i in year t. 
 
Under this measure, a region with a perfectly concentrated 
industrial structure (i.e. a single industry producing all GVA), 
the index returns a value of 0. The maximum value for 
diversity increases with the number of sectors being 
considered: for fifteen sectors the maximum value of the 
index is 0.93. 
 
Addressing the questions we set above, we can see the 
following. Firstly, we see from Figure 1 that between 1989 
and 2008 the industrial structure of the Scottish economy in 
aggregate remained relatively stable – for the sectors 
identified in the regional accounts publication. This does not 
play down the variation in growth rates within individual 
sectors over the period, but acknowledges that the economy 
as a whole – and for the sectors identified by the Regional 
Accounts publication – structure has not evolved perhaps as 
greatly as discourse would suggest. We do note however 
that in this short time period, and by these figures, the share 
of GVA in Scotland produced in the Manufacturing sector 
shrank from 23% to 13%.At the other end of Figure 1, the 
share of Scottish GVA produced in the “Financial 
intermediation” and “Real estate, renting and business 
activities” increased from 18% to 28% of GVA (largely 
driven by an increase from 13% to 20% in the “Real estate, 
renting and business activities” sector. The diversity index 
(shown in Figure 2) shows that on this measure (and for this 
sectoral aggregation) regional diversity was also relatively 
stable over these twenty years. Alternative aggregations of 
the Regional Accounts data for Scotland confirm the stability 
of regional industrial diversity over this period. 
 
Figure 3 indicates that greater regional industrial diversity 
was not associated with a shallower decline in regional GVA 
during 2009. London (the least diverse of the 12 regions 
considered here) had broadly the same decline in real GVA 
as the North East (-2.9%), but this latter region had 
significantly greater diversity in 2008. If anything, the 
observations in Figure 4 indicate that greater regional 
industrial diversity could be linked with lower average 
regional growth (over the period 1998-2009), however 
removing the data for London from this sample removes this 
negative relationship, and illustrates the weakness of this 
relationship. If one impact of increased economic diversity 
was decreased average growth rates then this could be an 
important counterargument to proponents of economic 
diversity. Aggregating the Regional Accounts to fewer 
industrial sectors, while changing the specific of the diversity 
measure, does not change the relationship described 
above. 
 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 consider the link between the size of 
the financial services sector in the regional economy and its 
growth performance during 2009 and over the decade from 
1998 to 2009.  
Again, as with diversity, the results suggest that there was 
no link between the share of financial services in the 
regional economy and the decline seen in 2009. Once 
again, the potential for the share of financial services to be 
related to higher average regional growth rates is largely 
due to the data for London. Remove this single observation 
and there appears to be little to suggest a relationship 
between financial services and regional growth. 
 
Update on Okun’s Law 
In our last Commentary, we discussed the empirical 
relationship between the rate of growth of GVA and the 
change in the unemployment rate. This relationship – known 
as Okun’s Law (Okun, 1962) – posits that such an empirical 
relationship exists and can be used to suggest both the rate 
of growth which would be consistent with a stable 
unemployment rate, and the rate of change in the 
unemployment rate for a given growth rate. This relationship 
typically shows increases (decreases) in the growth rate 
being associated with a falling (rising) unemployment rate. 
 
The initial results we reported in the last Commentary 
suggested that for both Scotland and the UK such a  
relationship could be estimated – albeit using Scottish 
quarterly GVA data only available back to 1998. Those 
results indicated that for Scotland an annual growth rate of 
2.04% would be required for employment to be stable, while 
the figure was very slightly lower for the UK at 2.02%. Our 
initial results last time suggested that there had been a 
break in this relationship since 2008, with unemployment 
rate changes being larger than would be suggested by a 
stable line of best fit. As we now have Q3 2010 data, we can 
estimate this relationship again and see if these conclusions 
appear to hold. We are particularly interested in this, since 
recent positive labour market developments, specifically a 
declining unemployment rate, together with a quarterly 
growth of 0.5% in Q3 could indicate that this relationship is 
changing. The Okun’s Law relationship between 
(percentage point) changes in the quarterly Scottish 
unemployment rate and Scottish GVA growth rate between 
Q1 1998 and Q3 2010 are shown in Figure 6, along with the 
line of best fit through these points (Okun’s Law is typically 
estimated with a straight line in this way). 
 
These data continues to suggest that the variables 
estimated last time  apply over the sample. The level of 
annual growth consistent with a stable unemployment rate is 
2.00% (0.497% growth in a quarter), marginally lower than 
the 2.02% reported in the last commentary. 
 
Note firstly that in all the last nine quarters (i.e. since the 
start of the 2008-9 recession) the unemployment rate has 
been increasing (i.e. we have no points below the horizontal 
axis) and the increases have been greater than those which 
would be suggested by the simple Okun’s relationship (i.e. 
all these points are above the line of best fit over the whole 
sample).  
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Figure 4:  2008 regional industrial diversity and average regional GVA growth (1998-2009) 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  Share of financial services sector in GVA in 2008 and 2009 GVA growth, UK regions 
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Looking at the path that these variables have taken during 
the period since Q3 2008, also marked on Figure 7, we can 
break the nine quarters of activity into three stages.  
 
From Q3 2008 we observe a clockwise movement of 
negative growth and increasing unemployment rates for 
three quarters to Q2 2009. From Q3 2009 we see three 
periods of broadly flat growth (climbing up the y-axis), 
combined with increases in the unemployment rate of up to 
0.5% to Q1 2010. The last two quarters we see positive 
growth however with no reductions in the unemployment 
rate in that quarter. The rate of increase in the 
unemployment rate in these last two quarters is lower 
however than those seen in either of the previous two 
stages. 
 
A paper published in February’s “Economic and Labour 
Market Review” (Chamberlin, 2011) examined – for the UK 
– the empirical basis and estimates of Okun’s Law over the 
most recent recession and previous recessions. This paper 
acknowledged that the unemployment rate – as used in 
Okun’s measure – is an imperfect estimate of the summary 
of the amount of labour being used in the economy, and that 
changes in output “can result from a number of sources and 
not just limited to the degree of idle labour in the economy” 
(Chamberlin, 2011, p. 125). Their “production function” 
approach decomposes changes in output to changes not 
only in the unemployment rate, but also labour productivity, 
average hours worked, the activity rate and the available 
population. We intend to examine the implications of this 
work for Scotland in the next few months and report the 
findings in later Commentaries. 
 
Chamberlin’s (2011) results over the period of the 2008-9 
recession indicates that, compared to earlier UK recessions 
in 1979-1981 and 1990-1991, output per hour has made a 
greater contribution to the peak-to-trough decline in GDP 
than in earlier recessions. This work also supports a “labour 
hoarding” argument to explain the relatively muted 
unemployment rate increase in the face of the decline in 
GVA. Compared to the recession of the early 1990s, for 
instance, UK GDP fell by 6.5% between 2008Q1 and 
2009Q3 with an increase of 2.7 points in the unemployment 
rate. In the early 1990s the unemployment rate increased by 
2.9 points for a fall in output of only 2.5%. 
 
Final demands and recent trends 
The Fraser of Allander Institute forecasting model 
acknowledges the drivers of economic activity in the 
Scottish economy to be (household) consumption, (central 
and local) government spending, investment, tourism and 
exports (to the rest of the UK and the rest of the World). For 
all three scenarios considered – High, Central and Low - 
recent movements in each of these measures, and most up-
to-date survey evidence for future trends, are discussed 
below.  
 
As we noted in the last Commentary, the data produced by 
the Scottish Government as part of the Scottish National 
Accounts Project (SNAP) have provided a vast amount of 
information about the dynamics of the Scottish economy 
since the first quarter of 1998. We have updated our 
forecasting model to reflect the values in this publication, 
taking account of other data sources and publications where 
these data are more detailed, or have greater coverage. Our 
primary new use of the SNAP data in this issue concerns 
the dynamics of the household expenditure and income 
variables, a real Investment series and exports to the rest of 
the world. The new (partial and experimental) Quarterly 
National Accounts for Scotland publication makes the direct 
comparison between Scotland and UK figures possible. We 
look forward to continued examination of all those data in 
the Quarterly National Accounts for Scotland over the 
coming months and future Commentaries. 
 
Consumption 
With the continued publication Scottish Quarterly National 
Accounts as part of the Scottish National Accounts Project 
(SNAP), we are able to identify changes in household 
expenditure in Scotland and the UK. Figure 8 shows how 
total household expenditure has changed in real terms 
(using the UK deflator) over the years 1998 to 2009. We can 
see that, while Scotland has broadly tracked the UK as a 
whole, between 2005 and 2007 Scottish household 
expenditure growth was greater than in the UK as a whole. 
The decline in household expenditure from these data was 
greater in Scotland than in the UK – falling by 4.4% in 
Scotland but only 3.4% in the UK. Nominal data for Q1 to 
Q3 of 2010 from SNAP suggest that Scottish household 
expenditure growth has typically been lower than for the UK 
as whole. 
 
Having data such as these allows us to much better 
understand the history and model the future of the Scottish 
economy and will have wide applications across policy and 
academic spheres. We can only use and report on some of 
these data in the Commentary for reasons of space, but 
interested readers are directed to the SNAP data on the 
Scottish Government website. 
 
Clearly as the largest net component of final demand for 
Scottish goods and services, the future behaviour of the 
households sector will be crucial for the next phase of the 
recovery in the Scottish economy. As the OECD notes in its 
November 2010 Economic Outlook, “private consumption 
will play a crucial role for the overall recovery in OECD 
economies as temporary cyclical factors and fiscal support 
measures are fading” (p. 22). One important dimension of 
this is the household savings rates, which reflect the 
differences between total household incomes and total 
expenditures. Broadly speaking, this will include moneys 
going to savings accounts or other investment vehicles or 
for the repayment of capital on credit cards. The extent to 
which households have retained their expenditures on an 
annual basis is clear from Figure 8 above. As household 
incomes have also suffered during the recession through 
increasing unemployment, reduced working hours and 
declining salaries (including bonuses), the behaviour of the 
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Figure 6: Share of  regional GVA in financial services sector in 2008 and average regional GVA growth (1998-2009) 
 
 
 
Figure 7:  Relationship between unemployment rate change (in percentage points) and GVA growth in Scotland, 
1998Q1 to 2010Q3 
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Figure 8:  Growth in annual household expenditure p.a. Scotland and UK, 1998 to 2009 
 
 
Source:  Scottish National Accounts Project and National Statistics. 
 
Figure 9:  Household savings ratios for Scotland and the UK, Q1 1998 to Q3 2010 
 
 
Source:  Scottish National Accounts Project and National Statistics. 
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household savings rate will be crucial for household 
expenditures. The major question is whether or not savings 
rates have peaked or if further reconciliations to households 
“balance sheets” are needed. As a fraction of household 
gross incomes, the (seasonally adjusted) gross savings 
ratios for Scotland and the UK between Q1 1998 and Q3 
2010 are shown in Figure 9. 
 
One crucial point from Figure 10 is that the Scottish savings 
rate has (since 2004) been above that for the UK as a 
whole. The height of the pre-crises consumer spending 
bubble is evidenced for the UK by a slightly negative gross 
saving rate in Q1 2008, although in that same quarter the 
savings rate in Scotland was 2.5%. The surge in savings 
rates as households curtailed spending meant that the 
savings rate increased and peaked at 8.9% and 7.5% in Q2 
2009 for Scotland and the UK respectively. Since then, the 
savings rates have typically fallen, but there is evidence of a 
recent increase for the UK so that in Q3 2010 the data 
suggests broadly comparable values of 4.8% in Scotland 
and 5.0% in the UK: broadly comparable to a crude average 
over the last twelve years of 5.0% and 4.6% respectively. 
 
Between Q2 2009 and Q2 2010, we can see clearly the 
effect that increased savings rate has had on the level of 
consumption expenditure. If the household saving rate had 
been 5.0% rather than the higher values over this period, a 
total of £2.3 billion worth of expenditure would have been 
made in the Scottish economy. We should allow for some 
portion of these expenditures – a high amount of household 
expenditures (around 60%) are typically spent on imports – 
not being made directly on Scottish goods and services. 
These simple calculations would therefore suggest that 
around £1.4 billion worth of demand for Scottish goods and 
services was removed from the Scottish economy during 
this period as a result of households reining in their 
expenditures. This is the equivalent of 1% of GDP in 2009. 
The most recent survey evidence suggests that weak 
consumer confidence and demand, as well as the VAT 
increase introduced in January 2011, and rising costs have 
been major themes affecting the retail sector, as well as 
more temporary phenomenon such as the bad weather 
before Christmas. Lower consumer confidence in Scotland 
than the UK will contribute to make 2011 a difficult year for 
retail in Scotland. 
 
Government spending 
We noted the significant declines in Resource and Capital 
DEL outlined in October’s Comprehensive Spending Review 
in November’s commentary to which readers are referred for 
further information. The large reduction in Capital DEL in 
2011-2, with more than half of the reduction over the whole 
Spending Review period in this year, will lead to significant 
reductions in the demand for construction activities in the 
Scottish economy. Further, reductions in government 
spending will impact across the whole  economy – not only 
in the public sectors – as sectors respond to the lower 
expenditures, for instance, lower incomes and expenditures 
by workers in the public sector as the public sector pay 
freeze erodes real incomes. We will examine the time path 
of government spending, and its role in the wider economy, 
further in later Commentaries. As alluded to in the 
introduction, it is anticipated that employment in the public
 
Figure 10:  Investment expenditures in Scotland and the UK, 1998Q1 to 2010Q3 (2008Q2=100) 
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sector will reduce as budgets for the financial year 2011-12 
are introduced across the devolved and reserved areas of 
competence.  
 
Investment 
Taking figures for Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF)  
from the SNAP QNAS data, we can calculate (using UK 
investment deflator series) a series of real GFCF in 
Scotland and the UK between 1998 and 2010Q3. Rebasing 
this to have the peak of investment activity as 100 we can 
see the effect of the credit crunch on investment in Scotland 
and the UK. Scottish investment in Q3 2010 was around 
10% below its pre-recession peak, while in the UK as a 
whole investment spending in the same quarter was just 
less than 20% below its peak. At its credit-crunch worst, 
investment spending in Scotland was 20% below peak, 
while the UK figure was almost 30% down at its lowest 
point. Interestingly both these lowest quarters were in 
2009Q4. Taken together, these data appear to suggest that 
the downturn in investment spending in the Scottish 
economy began later, was not as deep, and did not decline 
as fast as investment spending in the UK as a whole.  
 
Tourism 
Data from the International Passengers Survey – published 
on the 10th of February 2011 – revealed that for the UK as a 
whole the tourist market remained challenging. The 
spending in the UK by overseas tourists in the twelve 
months to December 2010 was flat in nominal terms, while 
UK residents spending abroad fell by 4% over the same 
period. These data do not cover domestic (i.e. UK) tourism 
expenditures in the UK, however the overseas tourism 
market is an important one for the Scottish tourist industry. 
 
VisitScotland’s figures for the UK tourist spending in 
Scotland between January and September indicate that it 
has seen a reduction in visits of 5% on the year earlier, with 
expenditure falling by 9%. The average length of stay was 
down 5.3%, with the average spend per night remaining 
broadly flat due to the reduction both in spend and the 
number of nights. Occupancy figures across most types of 
accommodation remained broadly flat compared to 2009, 
driven partly by discounting in the sector.  
 
Looking forward, the surveys of firms involved in Scotland’s 
tourism provision appears weak, both for accommodation 
and bar/restaurant trades. Discounting continues for a third 
of hotels in the first quarter of 2011, with the primary 
business constraint the lower numbers of tourists 
demanding accommodation and services. Lower occupancy 
figures continues to be an experience across all types of 
accommodation also, with self-catering properties 
particularly hurt towards the end of 2010. 
 
Exports to the rest of the UK 
The UK economy as a whole remains Scotland’s largest 
trading partner, providing the demand for over 60% of 
Scottish exports. Interestingly, as the SNAP data suggests, 
this share has declined over the last eight years, as exports 
to the rest of the world have strengthened following  the 
collapse in exports to the rest of the world between 2001 
and 2002. Preliminary data for 2010 Q4 suggested that the 
UK economy shrank by 0.5% in this quarter, well below 
predictions of growth of around 0.2-0.4%. The ONS noted 
that this was particularly affected by the wintry weather 
conditions and would have been anticipated to be “flat” (i.e. 
0% growth) without the adverse weather.  What would 
appear to be clear however, when the preliminary data is 
such a substantial fall, is that the level of growth seen in Q2 
and Q3 – largely driven by investment and construction 
dynamics – was not maintained into the end of 2010. 
 
Recent forecasts for the UK economy continue to predict a 
strong rebound, although most forecasters are appearing to 
emphasise the potential downside risks to their scenarios for 
growth. The Office for Budgetary Responsibility’s November 
2010 forecast was for growth of 1.8% in 2010, and 2.1% in 
2011. This is around the upper end of non-city forecasts for 
available in February 2011. The median new (i.e. in the last 
three months) forecast from  HM Treasury’s collection of city 
and non-city forecasting organisations is for 1.9% growth in 
the UK in 2011, largely driven by a growth in investment 
(median growth forecast = 3.9%), and strong (ROW) export 
growth (median = 6.6%). Domestic (i.e. UK) demand growth 
is forecast to be sluggish at 1.3% in the median forecast. 
The median of new growth forecasts for 2012 is 2.0%, some 
way below the OBR’s forecast of 2.6%. The range of 
forecasts for 2012 – covering 1.4% to 3.0% at the UK level – 
shows that the OBR’s forecast is towards the top of this 
range. Compared to the median new forecasts the OBR’s 
2012 growth figures predict higher investment spending 
(6.6% growth in the OBR against a median growth of 4.3%) 
and higher export growth (7.1% against 6.1%). Interestingly, 
the OBR’s figure for household expenditure growth in 2012 
is slightly below median new forecasts. 
 
The Global Connections Survey data reveals the cash 
values of the products exported to the rest of the UK by 
Scottish companies, by product. For instance this estimates 
that £10.2billion of the £45.2billion of exports sold to the rest 
of the UK in 2009 by Scottish firms, was provided by the 
“Financial intermediation” sector.   While this is useful 
information – and trends can be identified from this, albeit 
current price, series – these data do not identify the 
destination of these products by activity. It would be 
incredibly useful, for instance, to know how Scottish goods 
and services are used in the rest of the UK, i.e. for 
investment spending, for household consumption, as 
intermediate inputs to production, and so on. Without this, 
we can only speculate about how the different drivers of 
growth in the rest of the UK might  impact on the demand for 
goods and services produced in Scotland.  
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Table 1: GDP growth forecasts for 2011 and 2012 for top five export markets for Scottish products in 2009, % year on 
year change, plus United Kingdom and Euro Area 
 
  2011 2012 
 Share of Scottish 
exports to rest of 
the world in 2009 
 
IMF (January 
2011) 
 
OECD 
(November 2010) 
 
IMF  
(January 2011)  
 
OECD 
(November  2010) 
USA 15.5% 3.0% 2.2% 2.7% 3.1% 
Netherlands 9.6% n/a 1.7% n/a 1.8% 
France 7.5% 1.6% 1.6% 1.8% 2.0% 
Germany 6.1% 2.2% 2.5% 2.0% 2.2% 
Belgium 4.0% n/a 1.8% n/a 1.8% 
Others      
Asia 9.8% 8.4%
1
 n/a 8.4%
1
 n/a 
      
European Union n/a 1.7% n/a 2.0% n/a 
United Kingdom n/a 2.0% 1.7% 2.3% 2.0% 
 
Sources:  International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update (25th January 2011), OECD Economic Outlook No. 88 (November 
2010) and Global Connections Survey (21st January 2011). 
Notes:   
1
 The growth forecasts for “Developing Asia” is used for Asia here. The IMF forecasts stronger growth in China in both 2011 and 2012. 
 
Exports to the rest of the world 
The only exhaustive survey of Scottish exports to the rest of 
the world is the Global Connections Survey (GCS), which 
reported figures for 2009 on the 21st of January 2011. This 
publication sets out the total (cash) value of Scottish exports 
to overseas (i.e. non-UK) markets, and the sectoral 
distribution of these. A total of £21.1 billion of Scottish goods 
were exported in 2009, split 45:55 between exports to the 
twenty-seven countries of the EU and exports to non-EU 
countries. The single largest destination market for Scottish 
exports was the USA, as it has been back to 2005. Exports 
to the rest of the world were up by £530 million in cash 
terms, an increase of 0.9% in real terms. This real terms 
increase is only slightly above the 0.8% average real growth 
in the value of exports to the UK for the period since 2005. 
 
Real exports between 2005 and 2009 by industry are given 
in Figure 11. For each manufacturing industry, the current 
price values from the Global Connections Survey have  
been deflated by a implied deflator index for each 
manufacturing sector based on published real value for 
sectoral exports and a constant price series for that sector. 
Non-manufacturing exports are deflated using the same 
procedure but for a UK service export series. 
 
We can see from this that exports by the “Manufacturing of 
food drink and beverages” sector are the largest in real 
terms (at £3.2 billion in 2005 prices) and increased by 13% 
in the year to 2009. In the same year, exports by the “Coke  
and refined petroleum” sector fell by 21% in real terms, 
perhaps reflecting declining energy demands through the 
recession. Exports of “Business services” have risen over 
the last four years to now be the second highest value of 
exports in 2009, while exports by the “Electrical and 
instrumental engineering” sector have fallen from top 
position down to the fourth highest category of exports.  
Looking at the individual markets served by Scottish 
producers, it is clear that Scotland’s exports are however – 
as was discussed by commentators around the release of 
the UK trade figures in February 2011 – largely detached 
from the main areas of growth around the world. 
 
 Several caveats should be noted however. Firstly, several 
of the companies surveyed by the GCS indicate that the 
immediate destination of the goods leaving Scotland might 
not be the final destination of the products. The GCS gives 
no indication of which of the export destinations could be an 
en-route destination for Scottish goods. Our instinct would 
suggest that the position of the Netherlands as the second 
largest destination for exports could be consistent with its 
position as a major international transport and freight hub. 
Secondly, exports in five sectors (including financial 
intermediate and pension funds) are not allocated to a 
specific region due to lack of reliable company information. 
These “unallocable” exports have increased significantly in 
2009 (up 58%) so could offset much of the decline in 
exports to particular regions observed.  
 
With the above caveats in mind, the growth forecasts for 
2011 and 2012 in the top five destination markets for 
Scottish exports during 2009 are given in Table 1. 
The more regular survey of Scottish exports to the rest of 
the world is the Index of Manufactured Exports (IME) and 
the most recent results were released on 12th January 
2011. These cover only the manufacturing sectors, which 
are estimated to produce almost two-thirds of (non-UK) 
Scottish exports. This reported a real terms decrease in the 
value of total exports of 0.7% in the third quarter of 2010, an 
increase of 0.7% over the year to September 2010. The 
strongest increases over the year were in the “Food drink 
and tobacco” sector where both the “Food” and “Drink” 
sectors exports increased, by 8.8% and 10.8% respectively. 
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Figure 11: Real exports by industry to the rest of the world, (2005 prices, £million) 
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“Metals and metal products” also saw a greater than 10% 
increase in its exports over the year. Scottish engineering 
sectors continue to struggle for export growth, with exports 
down by 0.5% in the quarter and down 9.4% over the year. 
Since this category of exports accounts (in 2007 weights) for 
over 45% of Scottish manufacturing exports, this shows the 
difficulties continuing to experience by the Manufacturing 
sector, and stresses the potential difficulties in export led 
growth providing a stimulus to the Scottish economy in the 
short-term. 
 
Forecasts of the Scottish economy 
As with the forecasts published in the last seven 
Commentaries, we give three alternative scenarios for 
growth, employment and unemployment in the Scottish 
economy and in this Commentary we now forecast from 
2010 and 2013. We give a “Central” case, with “High 
growth” and “Low growth” as two respectively upper and 
lower growth alternatives. We intend these to capture the 
range of outcomes that are possible, given that there are 
considerable uncertainties surrounding any specific single or 
point estimates. While we do not give explicit probabilities 
for each of these outcomes, we see the “Central” scenario 
as being that which is most likely, while “High growth” and 
“Low growth” reveal the possible range of outcomes for the 
Scottish economy from 2010 to 2013. As we have noted in 
previous Spring Commentaries, we will know the outcome 
for Scottish GVA growth in 2010 with the publication of Q4 
2010 figures in April 2011. 
 
The forecasts: Detail 
In the three scenarios considered, the following elements 
are assumed to influence the factors of demand, and 
therefore economic activity, in the Scottish economy: 
 
Households  
In the Central scenario, we forecast that the significant 
contraction seen in household spending in 2009 does not 
repeat itself in 2010 and the years to 2013. However, 
household savings continue to be above average as fears 
over job security continue. Further, household income 
growth is forecast to remain slow as public-sector workers 
see real-terms income reductions as nominal incomes 
remain flat for two years and inflation damages purchasing 
power. Household expenditure growth on non-discretionary 
items remains limp as increases in the prices of energy, 
food and transport costs, continue to squeeze household 
budgets, along with the VAT increase to 20% introduced in 
January 2011. The reductions in welfare spending outlined 
in the October 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review are 
predicted to significantly affect household incomes through 
2012 and 2013, denting household expenditure growth. 
 
Government  
In the “Central” scenario, the increase in Government 
spending in Scotland seen in 2010 (on 2009 levels) expires 
and we predict annual falls in Government expenditures on 
goods and services for each of the next three years. These 
are “front-loaded” in that the major reduction is seen in 
2011, but there are further reductions in spending in 2012 
and 2013. It continues to be the case that the likelihood of 
the Government sector providing a stimulus to demand and 
therefore output growth over the next three years remains 
unlikely.  
 
Exports 
In the “Central” scenario, we predict a slow return to 
recovery in the UK, with household consumption and 
government expenditure remaining weak. Continued 
demand for Scottish manufacturing goods for capital 
replacement and investment expenditures in the UK keep 
demand for these products strong. Further, the use of 
Scottish-produced goods in output produced in the “rest of 
the UK” will cause the Scottish economy to benefit from a 
UK-wide export recovery to the rest of the world. In the 
“high” scenario, the recovery of investment and exports 
growth is faster than anticipated in our “Central” case, and 
close to the rate predicted by the OBR. 
 
Tourism 
Tourism spending, comprising around 2% of Scottish GDP 
(by expenditure) is predicted to remain flat as UK (including 
Scottish) households’ demands for travel is flat in 2011 and 
recovers through 2012 and 2013, driven in part by the 
continued weak value of the pound making overseas travel 
expensive. Discounting on the part of the industry continues 
to maintain, and perhaps grow, occupancy, particularly in 
the low and medium ends of the market. The high-end 
tourism market, led by business and discretionary spending, 
is slower to recover, but from 2012 and 2013 sees market 
share recovering as confidence returns to the business 
sector by the end of the forecast period. 
 
Investment and stocks 
Recent survey evidence indicates that the market for new 
investment projects remains weak, and will be largely driven 
by private sector investment programmes. New investment 
is mainly directed towards replacement, rather than new 
process/products, reducing potential investments. The most 
recent survey evidence confirms a weakening of investment 
confidence compared to the last quarter, and would indicate 
that the strength of an investment-led recovery remain 
weak.  Construction firms, heavily involved in new 
investment projects typically, also reveal an overwhelming 
majority of firms predicting a fall in their activity in 2011 
compared to 2010. 
 
Results 
 
Gross Value Added 
All three scenarios forecast Scottish GVA growth for the 
calendar years 2010 to 2013. As noted in previous
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Figure 12:  GVA growth 2009 and forecasts for 2010 to 2013, annual real 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13:  Forecasts of GVA growth in Production, 2010 to 2013 
 
 
 
-5%
-4%
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
High
Central
Low
OBR - November 2010
Independent average of new 
forecasts - medium term
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
2010 2011 2012 2013
High
Central
Low
Pages 21 - 40 
commentaries, we are predicting year-on-year figures so, 
despite 2010 having ended, we will not know the figures for 
GVA growth in Scotland until the publication of Q4 2010 
GVA growth in April 2011. The significant growth seen in Q2 
and Q3 2010 are likely to dominate the annual 2010 growth 
figures, so we can considerably narrow the prediction for 
2010 growth from that published in November 2010’s 
commentary. Having predicted 1.0% growth in 2010 back in 
November, we retain this as our central growth forecast for 
2010. The high and low growth forecasts for GVA growth in 
2010 now range from 1.1% to 0.9%. 
 
These three scenarios are presented in Figure 12, alongside 
(for comparison) the forecasts for the UK between 2010 and 
2013 made by the Office for Budget Responsibility. 
Forecasts for UK growth in 2010, 2011 and 2012 were 
collected by HM Treasury in February 2011 and the median  
of the forecasts in the last three months is also shown in 
Figure 12.  
 
Our forecasts for growth in 2010 are all now lower than the 
OBR and consensus forecasts for the UK for the same 
period, in part driven by the slower return to growth in 
household expenditures in Scotland than the UK and also, 
the marginally greater reduction in Government spending in 
Scotland compared to the UK as a whole in this year. We 
are now forecasting that the Scottish economy will see 
growth of 1.0% in both 2010 and 2011 in the central 
scenario, slower than the UK as a whole is forecast to grow 
in the median and OBR’s forecasts. The growth forecast of 
1.0% in 2011 is 0.1% lower than we forecast in November, 
in part due to the worsening outlook for consumer 
confidence in Scotland and the UK. While these UK 
forecasts are single point estimates, our forecast for 
Scotland is within the range of forecasts for the UK 
economy. 
 
Under the Central scenario, GVA growth in 2012 is forecast 
at 1.6% - slightly lower than the 1.9% forecast in November 
– and below the long-run average growth rate of the 
Scottish economy, while in 2013 we are forecasting growth 
of 1.9%. Our headline GVA forecast in the “Central” 
scenario, and the forecasts for the broad industrial sectors 
under this scenario, are given in Table 2. Table 3 shows the 
headline GVA growth forecasts under each of the three 
scenarios.  We present forecasts for GVA change in 
Scotland at broad industrial groupings under each of our 
three scenarios. The sectors highlighted are “Production”, 
“Services” and “Construction”. Figure 13 shows the GVA 
changes in Production under the three scenarios in each 
year to 2013, while Figure 14 and Figure 15 show the GVA 
changes in each year in “Services” and “Construction” in 
each scenario respectively. 
 
Across production sectors (shown in Figure 13), we are 
forecasting relatively robust recovery in 2010 in our three 
scenarios of around 2% in each scenario. Going forward, 
the assumed growth in world trade – albeit not recovering to 
levels seen before the 2008-9 recession – mean that we are 
now forecasting growth of between 3% and 4% in our 
central scenario in 2011 and 2012. The importance of the 
UK market for Scottish goods and services, and the 
relatively weak recovery in 2011 and 2012 forecast, mean 
that it is largely exports to the rest of the world which are 
assumed to drive this strong growth over the three years 
from 2011. 
 
The services sector, on the other hand (shown in Figure 14), 
we are forecasting to be damaged by the continued slow 
increase in domestic demand (households and government) 
over the next three years. Services GVA growth reaches 
1.2% in 2012 and 1.5% in 2013 in our “Central” scenario, 
with growth ranging from 0.4% to 1.9 and 0.7% to 2.1% in 
our “Low” and “High” scenarios in each of these years 
respectively. 
 
We forecast in our central scenario that the number of jobs 
in Scotland at the end of 2010 will be 2,242,000, up slightly 
from the September 2010 figures, as the most recent 
employment series indicates a rise over the final quarter of 
2010. Total job numbers at the end of 2010 are now 
forecast to be 20,000 higher than at the end of December 
2010, well above even our high growth forecasts for 2010 
published in November. It is a surprising feature of the 
labour market response over the recession and recovery 
that the “jobless recovery” seen through 2010 are perhaps 
now operating to increase job numbers and decrease 
unemployment. This lag between output growth and jobs 
growth would be consistent with a labour hoarding argument 
where unemployment rates would increase less than would 
be expected for a given contraction in output – as hours 
worked reduced, rather than employee numbers – which 
has been observed for the UK (Bell and Blanchflower, 
2011). Using this argument, we would anticipate that growth 
therefore in the early stages would not lead to reductions in 
the unemployment rate, as firms would utilize existing labour 
stocks rather than hiring workers. The recent decline in the 
unemployment rate has arguably arisen from increased 
hiring – following GVA growth with a lag – but of non full-
time workers, as is argued elsewhere in this Commentary. 
 
This will clearly have implications in the extent to which 
growth in employee job numbers (which are forecast here) 
differ from measures of the number of people in work. 
 
In “Central” the number of jobs is forecast to grow in 2011 
by around the same number of jobs in 2010, up around 
20,000. In 2012 and 2013, our central scenario forecasts 
jobs growth of 31,700 and 39,800 respectively. Total jobs at 
the end of 2013 are forecast to be 2,333,000, broadly 
comparable to the number of employee jobs in the Scottish 
economy at the end of 2004, and around 60,000 fewer than 
jobs at the end of 2007. Table 5 shows the net jobs growth 
forecast between 2010 and 2013 across our three 
scenarios. 
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Table 2:  Forecasts of GVA growth in the Scottish economy, Central scenario, 2010-2013 
 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
     Gross Value Added 1.0% 1.0% 1.6% 1.9%
     Production 1.9% 2.9% 4.0% 4.5% 
Services 0.7% 0.7% 1.2% 1.5% 
Construction 2.2% 0.6% 1.0% 1.3% 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Forecasts for headline GVA growth in the Scottish economy, three scenarios, 2010-2013 
 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
     High 1.1% 2.1% 2.4% 2.6%
Central 1.0% 1.0% 1.6% 1.9% 
Low 0.9% 0.3% 0.6% 0.9% 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Forecasts of Scottish employee jobs (000s) and net employee jobs change in central scenario, 2010 to 2013 
 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total jobs (000s), Dec         2,242         2,261         2,293         2,333  
Net annual change (jobs)       20,013        19,780        31,741        39,808  
% change from previous year 0.9% 0.9% 1.4% 1.7% 
     Agriculture (jobs, 000s)             32              33              34              35  
Annual change         2,800            685         1,120         1,409  
Production (jobs, 000s)           214            221            230            241  
Annual change -     23,011         6,434         9,237        10,781  
Services (jobs, 000s)         1,858         1,870         1,890         1,916  
Annual change       16,650        11,827        20,018        25,864  
Construction (jobs, 000s)           137            138            139            141  
Annual change       23,673            834         1,366         1,754  
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Forecast Scottish net jobs growth in three scenarios, 2010 to 2013 
 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
     High       22,267        42,626        51,025        57,262  
Central       20,113        19,780        31,741        39,808  
Low       18,357         5,895        11,586        19,256  
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Figure 14:  Forecasts of GVA growth in Services, 2010 to 2013 
 
 
 
Figure 15:  Forecasts of GVA growth in Construction, 2010 to 2013 
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Looking at the sectoral breakdown of these jobs, the 
Construction sector is forecast to see an increase through 
2010 of around 24,000, largely offsetting the decline of 
23,000 in the Production sectors. Services job numbers are 
forecast to increase from 2009 levels by around 17,000 in 
the Central scenario. In the years from 2011 onwards, with 
muted job creation, jobs growth is forecast to focus in the 
“Production” sectors and “Services” sectors.  
 
Unemployment 
We present our 2010 to 2013 forecasts for unemployment, 
as measured by the ILO definition, as well as those 
receiving unemployment benefits, in Table 6. The preferred 
measure of unemployment is the ILO definition, as given by 
the Labour Force Survey, as it reveals the extent of labour 
which is unemployed and 
Table 6:  Forecasts of Scottish unemployment in “Central” scenario, 2010 to 2013 
 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
     ILO unemployment 215,000 234,072 224,945 212,657
Rate
1
 8.0% 8.8% 8.4% 7.9% 
Claimant count     138,300      150,849      144,967      137,048  
Rate
2
 5.0% 5.3% 5.0% 4.7% 
 
Notes: 
1
 = rate calculated as total ILO unemployed divided by total of economically active population aged 16+. 2 = rate calculated as claimant 
count recipients divided by sum of claimant count and total jobs. The latest estimates of the figures published in Table 6 were published in 
February 2011 in the Labour market statistics for Scotland. These estimated the ILO unemployment rate at the end of 2010 and the claimant 
count rate in December as 8.0% and 5.0% respectively. November’s Commentary had forecast these values at the end of the year as 9.3% and 
5.2%, meaning that our forecast errors were 1.3% and 0.2% respectively.  
 
 
 
Figure 16: Scottish ILO unemployment rate and claimant count unemployment rate, 1992-2010 and forecasts to 2013 
under three scenarios 
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Table 7:  ILO unemployment rate and claimant count measures of unemployment under three scenarios, 2010 to 2013 
 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
ILO unemployment rate 
    High 7.9% 7.8% 6.6% 5.4%
Central 8.0% 8.8% 8.4% 7.9% 
Low 8.1% 9.4% 9.8% 10.1% 
     Claimant count 
    High 4.8% 4.7% 4.0% 3.2%
Central 4.9% 5.3% 5.0% 4.7% 
Low 4.9% 5.7% 5.9% 6.1% 
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available for work, rather than that portion of the available labour force in receipt of unemployment benefit. As such, it 
is a better measure of the extent to which labour resources are not currently employed in productive activity in 
Scotland. Table 7 shows the ILO and claimant count measures of unemployment over the period 2010 to 2013 in 
each of the three forecast scenarios. 
 
We diagrammatically show the forecasted path of ILO and claimant count unemployment under each of the three 
scenarios in Figure 16. 
 
__________________ 
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